



UKRAINE AT WAR:
TRUTH AGAINST
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

Materials of the conference

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COVER PHOTO

PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
October 2014

A Ukrainian soldier reads a book during a brief break in the fighting with pro-Russia separatists inside Donetsk airport. The airport has been the scene of fierce fighting between the government troops and pro-Russia separatists since May 2014 till February 2015.

PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
May 2014

Kids at Slovyansk demonstrate used bullet cartridges they found near the town (at that moment the city of Slovyansk used to belong to the area controlled by the s.c. "Donetsk people's republic").

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FOR EWORD

The event ***Ukraine at War: Truth against Russian Propaganda*** was conceived to provide representatives of the European institutions including the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the European Parliament as well as representatives of the media with an insight into Russian political and military propaganda and the way it is used in the current military conflict in eastern Ukraine. The objective is to unmask how the Kremlin directed media work in order to misinform and manipulate the population of eastern Ukraine.

We suggest looking at the problem of the Russian information war (which is also considered as a psychological war or a semantic war) in a number of different aspects.

First of all, its role in provoking the war and escalation of the armed conflict. The documentary "Rejection. Fight for Ukraine" prepared by the Ukrainian NGO Centre for Civil Liberties will be shown for this purpose (p. 15).

Russian military journalist Arkadiy Babchenko with a background in Kremlin information policy and experience reporting on the Russian Army during the Chechen campaigns claims there would be no war in eastern Ukraine without large scale propaganda (p.25).

The falseness of many of the messages became obvious first of all thanks to the StopFake initiative which is going to provide us with the prominent examples of Russian propaganda (p. 12-14).

The second aspect is the contribution of Russian propaganda to the extremely high level of violence and human rights abuses in eastern Ukraine. This topic is followed by Ukrainian human rights NGOs, in particular the Center for Civil Liberties (p. 19-21).

The third aspect is the threat which is posed by Russian propaganda not only to Ukraine and

to Russians but also to the EU. This growing threat is presented and analysed by researcher Oleg Panfilov (p. 8-9).

All of these thoughts could be just theoretical if there would be no real war and real deaths. If the costs were not so great. According to the UN data approximately 6,5 thousand people lost their lives during the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Photos taken by Sergei Loiko remind us of this human dimension.

To a great extent the problem of this information war remains concealed for the wide public in EU. Thanks to the work of a number of researchers working since the beginning of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine consequences of neglecting this challenge have become much clearer.

One result of the growing understanding among policy makers is EU High Representative Federica Mogherini's team's increasing efforts on countering Moscow propaganda.

That is why the most important thing about this event and the main aim of its organisers is not just to have another talk on Russian propaganda but to provide the EU institutions with recommendations in order to help establish an EU wide strategy on neutralizing Russian propaganda. This paper will be presented during the event and will accompany this brochure.

Members of the panel:



Oleg Panfilov,
Ilia State University (Georgia)
professor, an internationally
recognized expert on press freedom
and journalism in crises, journalist
working for Radio Free Europe



Tetiana Matychak,
editor in chief, Stopfake.org,
an informal platform de-masking
Russian propaganda in Ukraine



Oleksandra Matviichuk,
head of board, Center for Civil Liberties
human rights NGO, coordinator of
Euromaidan SOS initiative



Arkadiy Babchenko,
journalist and war reporter with
personal experience of first and
second Chechen war

ORGANIZERS OF THE EVENT:

Centre for Civil Liberties NGO (*Ukraine*),

People in Need NGO (*Czech Republic*),

Pavlo Pazelskyi and **Marek Polach** (volunteers).

The event is organized
under the auspice of **Mr. Jaromír Štětina** –
Member of the European Parliament.

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PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
October 2014

*Ukrainian soldier Serhii
Tanasov takes a smoking break
in the fighting with pro-Russia
separatists inside
Donetsk airport.*



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
October 2014

*A destroyed
Ukrainian army tank stands
on the tarmac of Donetsk
airport in October.*

Russian Propaganda:

A Background

Since the August of 1999 Russia has been in the process of restoring the traditions of Soviet propaganda. Newly-appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin launched the second Chechen war and at the same time imposed legal restrictions on Russian journalists that directly violated the Constitution. For the first six months of the war in the North Caucasus more than 30 journalists were detained, most of them foreign. At the same time the intelligence agencies set up a number of information centres, emphasising that journalists are required to only use official information.

In September 2000, President Putin signed the doctrine of information security establishing new rules on information policy of the Russian Federation. The majority of provisions of the Doctrine contradict Russian legislation and obligations relevant in the Russian Federation to respect the freedom of speech and freedom of expression.

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The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation determines the mechanism of strengthening the state propaganda and state control over independent media. It

called for measures to prevent "information aggression" by the West. The doctrine never became law, but following the approval of President Putin it became the original concept for the creation a new state structure – the Department of Information Security, which was supposed to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the department.

In 2001, after the largest media-holding in Russia "the Bridge", in operation since 1992 and owned by Vladimir Gusinsky, was shut down by the Prosecutor General. In the years that followed a number of media outlets were closed, and assets that remained were often taken over by the state-owned energy giant Gazprom. At the largest independent television channel NTV the management and staff of journalists were replaced. The channel became part of the of state propaganda machine.

Having established control over the majority of the media in Moscow and the Russian regions, a new state controlled source of information was launched in 2005 to broadcast in a number of foreign languages: Russia Today. The TV channel renamed "RT" that today broadcasts in English, Arabic, German, Russian and Spanish is now part of the state holding company "Russia today", uniting two agencies and the radiobroadcasting company "Voice of Russia". The company is financed by the state budget, and even during times of economic crisis its budget has been increasing every year. In 2015 the Russia Today's budget will reach 13.85 billion rubles (about 235 million euros)¹.

¹ At the GDP \$24805/per; for the comparison: the GDP in the UK – \$39511, and the financing of corporation such as BBC in 2014 was \$381.000.000.

An article of the Criminal code on extremism became very convenient to the authorities. In 2008, for example, criminal proceedings were initiated against Vladimir Efremov, a journalist from Tyumen, for criticising the local police. In 2014 the journalist Boris Stomakhin was sentenced to six and a half years in prison, after being an outspoken critic of Russian state policy in Chechnya for a number of years. After the adoption of laws restricting the activities of NGOs in Russia there are almost no organisations that can provide assistance or support to journalists.

The Russian propaganda machine has improved upon the propaganda of the Soviet Union by taking full advantage of contemporary technologies. Persistently lying on a daily basis manipulation of facts and production of “fakes” bring results, especially on peoples of the post-soviet republics, who lived for generations under propaganda.

There are several large and formally independent holdings which belong to businessmen close to Putin Yuriy Kovalchuk, Alisher Usmanov, Vladimir Potanin, Alexander Mamut as well as Gazprommedia, owned by “Gazprom”. Media positioning themselves as independent play only a minor part in the media landscape. They do not have a large influence on the creation of public opinion or in the struggle against state propaganda.

From the time Vladimir Putin has been in power journalists feel markedly less safe in their work. In the last 15 years a few dozen journalists² have been killed. To date investigations into these crimes are not fully solved. Significantly, the level of criminal prosecution against journalists has increased. Every year 60-80 criminal cases are opened against journalists on charges of libel or extremism. The most absurd reasons have often been used to violate the right to freedom of speech and expression. An article of the Criminal code on extremism became very convenient to the authorities. In 2008, for example, criminal proceedings were initiated against Vladimir Efreimov, a journalist from Tyumen, for criticising the local police. In 2014 the journalist Boris Stomakhin was sentenced to six and a half years in prison, after being an outspoken critic of Russian state policy in Chechnya for a number of years. After the adoption of laws restricting the activities of NGOs in Russia there are almost no organisations that can provide assistance or support to journalists.

Russian propaganda is nowadays focused on internal and external audience. The “internal audience” is the population of Russia. In some understanding this category includes the population of other post-Soviet countries as well as inhabitants of the USSR that live in the EUUSA and others countries. For instance, approximately 5 million people live in Germany that understand and use Russian language in ordinary life.

The “external” audience is made up of the population of other countries that watch Russia Today. It’s very hard to measure the extent of Russian influence but anecdotally RT is beginning to become a force in changing public opinion.

Traditional media aside, Russian propaganda and those that practice “political technology” intensively use the internet. In 2000 the internet was used as a tool to influence Russian audiences whereas today many projects that are form part of the front of on the online information are sponsored by the federal budget. The internet could potentially be a much more potent tool of influence than television, especially as regards youth. One may say, for instance, that starting from the early years of Putin’s presidency youth “patriotic” organizations began to appear, — “Nashi”, “Iduschie vmeste”, “Ros-siya molodaya” and others organisations were coordinated directly by governors appointed by the Administration of the President.

Putin’s youth supporters are known for their loud and controversial demonstrations, be it for the burning of the books by writers who criticise Putin’s policies or chasing foreign diplomats³. Now these activists take part in the virtual informational war. One may talk about so called “Olga’s trolls”, the state project in Olgin, not far from Moscow. And in Saint-Petersburg such similar work is done by the “Internet investigations” organisation. Their main aim is to criticise or persuade Putin’s opponents in forums, chats and news sites⁴.

The Russian propaganda machine has improved upon the propaganda of the Soviet Union by taking full advantage of contemporary technologies. Persistently lying on a daily basis manipulation of facts and production of “fakes” bring results, especially on peoples of the post-soviet republics, who lived for generations under propaganda. The influence of propaganda in the post-Soviet space depends on the development of journalism in these respective countries. Almost in all of these countries, including Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, journalism education is at the same low level as in the USSR.

For the last 15 years Putin has created so influential and so well-financed a structure of state propaganda and mechanism of information war that making statements, blaming and reminding Putin about the existence of laws and responsibilities before international organisations will not cause any positive effect. Today it is important more than ever to identify mechanisms that could effectively neutralise Russian propaganda.



Oleg PANFILOV

Iliia State University (Georgia) professor, researcher of the propaganda issues, journalist, Commentator and author of the Radio Liberty.

Used to work as an author and editor of the First Caucasian Channel (Georgia), as a head of monitoring service of the Glasnost Defense Foundation in Moscow, as human rights expert of the UN in Tehran, Islamabad, Kabul, Almaty, Ashgabat, head of Moscow office of the Committee for Protection of Journalists, New York;

Founder and former director of the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations at the Russian Union of Journalists (Russia). Founder of NGO Resource Center (Georgia) and Georgian International Media Center. Oleg Panfilov is an author of over 3000 articles published since 1975 in newspapers and magazines in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Sweden, Israel, Iran, USA, Poland, Bulgaria, Germany, Czech Republic, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. He is also an author and co-author of over 40 books incl. “Putin and the Media: Revival of Soviet Style Propaganda”, “Information blockade of Chechnya (September 1996 – December 2000)”, “Russia – Georgia. Information warfare, August 2008”, “Information War in Chechnya. Facts, Documents, Reports. November 1994 – September 1996”, “A High-Risk Job. Abuse of the rights of journalists in CIS states”, “Directory for the journalists working in war zones”.

Oleg Panfilov received a number of awards including Grand-prix at Image of Faith International Film Festival, Award of the Russian Union of Journalists, Honorary Doctor at the Gori University (Georgia).

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2 Mainly the list of killed journalists is connected to the independent media “Novaya Gazeta” after 2000: Yuriy Schemkochihin, Anna Politkovskaya, Anastasia Baburova, Igor Domnikov, Nataliya Estemirova.

3 For instance, the event against the ambassador of the UK Anthony Brenton, as well as an Embassy of Estonia in Moscow that was attacked in 2007

4 www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=5



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES

Ukrainian machine gunner Ivan Kuryata from Dnipro-1 militia battalion was killed October 8 in a mortar shelling in Peski. In the photo he is shooting his 1940-s Degtyarev machine gun during a fire exchange with pro-Russia rebels at the village of Peski on the outskirts of Donetsk earlier in September 2014.



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
October 2014

*Ukrainian troops inside
Donetsk airport.*



Tetiana MATYCHAK –

co-founder and editor in chief, Stopfake.org. Editor in chief, Politeka.net.

Tetiana Matychak started working as a financial journalist and an editor 10 years ago. She worked as a journalist and an editor in such newspapers as Capital, Segodnya [Today], Delovaya stolitsa [Business week], and on such websites as Liga.net, Korrespondent.net and Prostobank.ua.

On March, 2014, after the Russian annexation of the Crimea, Tetiana, together with other Mohyla School of Journalism alumni, launched a website Stopfake.org, which reveals false information about Ukraine in Russian, Ukrainian and Western media.

Tetiana Matychak holds Bachelor degree in Philosophy, Master degree in Journalism and Masters degree in Economic Sciences.

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TOP 10 Lies about Ukraine Debunked by Stopfake.org

Stopfake.org is a Ukrainian website that reveals false information about Ukraine in pro-Kremlin media. This project is unique, because Stopfake journalists verify not only the words of politicians and businesspeople, but also the work of their colleagues.

It was launched on the second of March 2014 to fight the erroneous information that was spreading over the Internet during Ukraine's crisis in Crimea. Since then we faced a crash of the Malaysian Airlines jumbo jet, a war in Eastern Ukraine, and other tragic events. Russian propaganda twisted all the facts about these events and showed them to the Western audience, and to the Russian people themselves, in a distorted light.


Stopfake journalists are alumni from the Mohyla School of Journalism and the post-graduate program Digital Future of Journalism based on the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

During the last 15 months, they checked tens of thousands of articles, photos and videos. They have revealed about 400 fakes.

One of the types of overwhelming propaganda is giving the enemy a negative image. For example, some Russian media describe Ukrainians in the following terms: "fascists", "junta-ists", and "murderers". Each word has negative emotional coloring. They are quoted in key media designed to agitate against Ukraine.

To support these ideas of propaganda pro-Kremlin media should use photo fakes and video fakes, because the audience needs a proof for each statement – and these media create alternative reality, providing false proofs.

Here you can find 10 examples of the most blatant lies of pro-Kremlin media supported by photo fakes that have been debunked by Stopfake.org since March 2014.




FAKE



FAKE: American Tanks Found in Donbas
 Published on April 3, 2015 by ZvezdaTV channel

odání nacistických komand a zločineckých band. Pravidelně informují, že ve více regionech samostatně úřadují různé ozbrojené skupiny, které tam nastolily vlastní zákon. Kyjev na ně nemá téměř žádný vliv. Informuje slovenský zpravodajský server IľavnéSprávy.sk.



FAKE: Ukrainians Must Kneel to the Right Sector
 Published on February 24, 2015



TRUTH



TRUTH: The photo was taken during military U.S. Army maneuvers in Texas in 2013 and edited in Photoshop

КОЛОМІЯНИ ЗУСТРІЛИ ТІЛО ЗАГИБЛОГО БІЙЦЯ АТО РОМАНА ФУРИКА СТОЯЧИ П. КОЛІНАХ (ФОТО-ВІДЕО)




TRUTH: Kolomyia residents are paying tribute to their fellow-townsmen, who were killed in the fighting at the Donbas



FAKE




FAKE: Svoboda political party designs Hitler hryvnia banknote.
Reported on January 12, 2015 by Rossiya 1 TV channel.




FAKE: An up-to-date image from the Donbas.
Reported on October 26, 2014 by Russian First Channel.



FAKE: 400 U.S. mercenaries on Ukrainian soil.
Published on January 28, 2015 by liveleak.com.



FAKE: The Ukrainian army bombarding Donetsk region with incendiary shells.
Reported on June 12, 2014 by Zvezda TV channel.



TRUTH




TRUTH: The source for the fake is a real photo edited in Photoshop.




TRUTH: It is a photo of 1995 from Chechnya depicting reburial of peaceful inhabitants of Grozny.




TRUTH: Ukraine does not hire any mercenaries from the USA. This photo was taken in Afghanistan in 2010.



TRUTH: The video contains footage of American bombardment during the Second Battle for Fallujah (8 Nov–20 Nov, 2004), the operation 'Phantom Fury'.



FAKE




TRUTH



FAKE: Photo of victim in South-Eastern Ukraine.
Published on June 18, 2014 in social networks.




TRUTH: This girl was killed in Syria on June 13, 2014.



FAKE: A photo of Ukrainian soldiers from the crashed airplane Il-76.
Published on June 14, 2014 by Politicus.ru website.



TRUTH: This photo started appearing in the Web a month before. It has nothing to do with Il-76 soldiers.




FAKE: A Ukrainian soldier eats an arm of a Russian man.
Published on June 6, 2014 by Rusvesna.su website.



TRUTH: It is a backstage photo from a Russian 2008 science-fiction movie We are from the Future.



FAKE: A photo of burning Donetsk city.
Published on May 26, 2014 by Polinavigator.net.



TRUTH: It is a peaceful Donetsk photo edited in Photoshop.

Rejection. Fight for Ukraine

The film "Rejection. Fight for Ukraine" is dedicated to the events in the Eastern Ukraine during the spring of 2014. That was the time when the war actually started, although it was not obvious to many of us, even in Ukraine.

The film was produced by Ukrainian NGOs: Human Rights House Kyiv; Center for Civil Liberties; Euromaidan SOS Initiative; as well as the Ukrlife.tv internet-channel

The film is not an attempt to assign guilt, but to analyze the key reasons that led to the war. In particular it investigates the mass violence that started at exactly the same time, in March and April 2014. Tactics such as bloody attacks on pro-Ukrainian protests, kidnappings, and illegal detention and torturing of activists and other groups of citizens were commonplace at the time. It was the violence at that particular time that was one of the main reasons that led to the occupation of the part of the Eastern Ukraine. The narrative finishes in late May 2014 with the first serious battle in Donetsk.

The project team did not enter into a battlefield, as that is a fundamentally different and much more complicated chapter of the story. A few dozen interviews were filmed while working on this documentary.

The film looks at the perspectives of the activists, witnesses, and victims, but also at points-of-view of the local authorities and police. Although they all tell their personal story, at the end of the day those micro stories represent something larger.

There are different views of the key factors that caused the war; but most would agree that this is not only a fight for Donbass, but for Ukraine itself.



Director — Ludmilla Nemyria
Author — Maria Tomak






PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
January 2015

A resident of Avdeyevka, a town near Donetsk airport, examines his 8th floor apartment destroyed by a direct shelling hit.



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
May 2014

*A scene inside the town of
Kramatorsk near Slovyansk
after a battle between Ukraine
security forces and
pro-Russia gunmen.*



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
April 2014

Gorlovka councilman Volodymyr Rybak is mourned by his widow Yelena, second from left, comforted at the grave side by their daughter. Volodymyr was killed after an attempt to restore the Ukrainian flag on the city police station in Gorlovka.

Weapons of Mass Destruction:

When the Freedom of Speech Turns Into War Propaganda

“The time has come, when we all recognize, that word, camera, photo, the Internet and information in general have become yet another type of weapon, yet another type of armed forces”

SERGEY SHOYGU,
Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation,
March 27, 2015

The freedom of speech is a fundamental principle of European democracy. One cannot overstate the importance of the very process of shaping of public opinion, which requires nearly unimpaired access to information and free distribution of various opinions, for implementation of the core principle – the right to know.

However, when democracy clashes with authoritarianism everything turns a lot more difficult. Following the principle of the freedom of speech democratic principles not only require giving the floor to the party, which definitely tell lies, but to treat its standpoint with equal respect. Lies multiplied by imperial ambitions result in what is called by the International Covenant of Human Rights the violation of the absolute ban on war propaganda and incitement to discrimination, hostility, hatred, and violence, while we become hostages of the maxim attributed to Voltaire: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend, to death, your right to say it”.

Now, let’s see to what makes us die today.

Since the beginning of Euromaidan, strong pro-government and, subsequently, pro-Russia propaganda campaign had been launched. Its task was to discredit peaceful protests in order to justify unlawful use of force against protesters. The Government once again resorted to the technology, tested during the Orange Revolution, of identifying the protesters with ultra-right extremists. Right Sector (Ukrainian: Правий Сектор, Pravyi Sektor) was qualified as the driving force of the protest, while Russian media presented the group as neo-Nazi organization. Of course, figures give quite another picture. There were around two million people participating in the protests across the country (aside from five million people, who were part of the protest infrastructure). As of early February, Euromaidan Self-Defence (Ukrainian: Самооборона, Samooborona) numbered approximately 12 thousand people, divided into 39 companies (Ukrainian: Сотня, Sotnya. The word means “a hundred” and approximately equivalent to company). Thus, according to Viacheslav Likhachiov, a known expert in anti-Semitism and xenophobia monitoring, the Right Sector itself (23rd sotnya) accounted for only 300 people,

while Svoboda (2nd sotnya) – around 150 people.¹ Participation of Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Right Sector, in the presidential race in May 2014 brought him only 0.7% of votes.² But inasmuch as Russia has almost no independent media left, its thesis about ‘neo-Nazi state coup d’état’ became perpetuated in public opinion. The remarkable fact is that the Right Sector almost caught up with the ruling in Russia Edinaya Rossiya party in terms of the number of references in the media (according to the public.ru research in April 2014).³

The campaign has had its follow-up in the use of ‘protection of Russian-speaking people’ rhetoric, which became a formal reason to occupy Crimea, while these were Russian people, who fell victims to that propaganda, in the first place. That was proved by the Russia-wide poll held by Levada-Center (perhaps the only trustworthy sociological research centre in Russia) in April 2014. Thus the results of the poll showed that 94% of Russians get to know about the events in Ukraine and Crimea from television broadcasts.⁴ TV-crazy and diligently nurtured hatred towards ‘Kyiv Junta’ and fear of mythical ‘chasteners’ resulted in 88% of Russians approving of annexation of Crimea and 74% being ready to support Russian government in case of its open military conflict with Ukraine.

Separatist sentiments in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine have been largely fed by Russian propaganda as well. With a helping hand of Russian media, part of Ukrainian population rejected newly elected government as ‘illegitimate and neo-Nazi’. Not incidentally, Ukrainian cable TV channels were cut off in Crimea in March 2014. Meanwhile Russian TV launched widespread campaign calling to choose ‘between Mother Russia and Nazi Ukraine’. The fear of ‘fascists and banderivsi exterminating Russian-speaking population’ had given rise to violent reaction to any display of patriotic feelings in the East of Ukraine.



Oleksandra MATVIICHUK

is Chairwoman of the Board of the Center for Civil Liberties, a non-governmental organization aimed at promoting the democratic development and human rights. She is member of several working groups involved in drafting legislation, aimed at bringing the Ukrainian legislation in line with the international obligations of Ukraine in the field of human rights. She is Member of the Advisory Council under the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights. Ms Matviichuk has authored several publications on different human rights related topics. She is also an author of the annual Monitoring Report on “Political Persecutions of Civil Society in Ukraine”.

At present Ms Matviichuk coordinates EuroMaidan SOS the civil initiative, which was created after violent crackdown of the peaceful demonstration on the Nezalezhnosti (Maidan) square. The initiative was working 24/7 providing legal and other help for the persecuted participants of the resistance movement all over Ukraine. EuroMaidan SOS continues their work and documents of human rights violations and war crimes in the occupied Crimea and Donbas.

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1 www.polit.ru/article/2014/09/06/radical_nationalism/
2 www.cvk.gov.ua/info/protokol_cvk_25052014.pdf
3 www.polit.ru/article/2014/09/06/radical_nationalism/
4 www.levada.ru/12-05-2014/rossiyane-ob-osveshchenii-ukrainskikh-sobyti-i-sanktsiyakh

From an interview of 20-years old Dorzhy Batomunkuev, regular soldier, 5th tank brigade (military unit No. 46108, Ulan-Ude, Russia), who was wounded in action near Debaltseve:

“Well, there is nothing to regret about now. No offence at all. I know that I fought for the good. Following the news about Ukraine – elections, elections, elections, then that Orange Revolution, and then it all started... Odessa, Mariupol... When still in Peschanka, the training unit, in Chita, where we had basic military training, we watched TV. We watched news... about Odessa... when people died in a fire. We felt... sick. Because of the feeling... that it's wrong. It is inhumane, unfair. And I was sent here... well, regular army soldiers can't be sent here. Were not allowed at all. Nevertheless, I came here. With a sense of... not duty, but justice”.

www.novayagazeta.ru/society/67490.html?p=2

From interview with 50-years old Victor, nom de guerre 'Poacher', from Yoshkar-Ola, fighting near Lugansk:

“My conscious made me come to Novorossiya. I felt ashamed when I saw that people were killed by fascists, while the government and ordinary citizens just watched it like some kind of reality show. If I hadn't come here, I would have had to defend Yoshkar-Ola from fascists. I think that was an impulse, but when I arrived I saw that the reality here was a lot worse than it was shown in Russia. And I have millions of relatives and friends here, all of them are my brothers and sisters here”.

www.kragrad.ru/clauses/persona-grata/yoshkarolinets-voyuet-v-opolchenii-na-ukraine/

From the interview of Aleksandr Boroday, Russian political analysis, former leader of illegal military group in Donetsk:

“Yes, war can be ethical duty for a man. There can't be anything immoral about defending your blood and soul brothers and sisters. Willingness to make sacrifices is also a moral example. Fight for the sake of abstract idea. And it is exactly the time when morality is manifested during such dramatic period, time of bifurcation point, if you wish, when people have to make a choice... War is basically mobilization of, I'm sorry I put it like this, human material. It is mobilization of intellect, and will based on patriotic impulse, on love of country”.

www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/68042.html?p=7

Russian propaganda uses information as a tool for curving parallel (fiction) reality. Take media coverage of crackdown of peaceful demonstration is support of unity of Ukraine in Donetsk on April 28, 2014 as an example, when Russian TV and printed media, namely ITAR-TASS⁵, using actual footage and photos, showed everything to the contrary, claiming that Ukrainian ultra-right nationalists attacked antifascist demonstration with baseball bats.

The task of misinformation, manipulation, and propaganda is to infest public conscious with the idea that there is no 'objective truth'. Thus, the essence of the words and whether these words are really true is not important. The more important is the function of words and their influence on human mind and, subsequently, public behavior. Below are a couple of examples of such influence published by Russian media.

We have, basically, witnessed how Russian media had become a subsystem integrated into the core of military operation. It is Russian propaganda, which feeds the violence that had covered large area. As Dr. Yuriy Gromyko (psychological sciences) shrewdly put it, the place of military industrial complex as basic element and implementing tool of military actions has been taken by the mass media military industrial complex. These days, 'the discussion and demonstration of military actions development, public opinion over the way these actions are covered in the media and carried out have become a part of nature of these very military actions'.⁶

Given that official number⁷ of victims of the military conflict has exceeded eight thousand people, of which around seven thousand are civilians, and the number of people forced to abandon their homes reaches two million⁸, one cannot but draw parallels. There once was a well-known research of the influence of One Thousand Hills Free Radio and

From conversation with Victor Volkov, the Deputy of Balashov district council (Russia), about Igor Yefimov, who was born in Balashov and died in the actions near Luhansk:

"He died as a hero. We should treat him as our national hero. He really died at war, as he was covering this corridor for evacuation of women, children and seniors. He decided to go there because, and I'm sure of this, he realized that Russia's future is made now in Ukraine; that real fascism is growing in strength there. He died in the fight against fascists, against those banderivtsi, who are so fiercely against Russia. We all know that they won't stop, because they have Uncle Sam behind them".

www.fn-volga.ru/article/view/id/212

Television broadcasts on escalation of violence in Rwanda. Its results showed that in the areas of radio broadcast, the number of convicted of genocide were 62-69% higher than in the regions where there was no broadcast. The research directly manifests that the violence was the result of public calls made through media and not just public sentiments.

Similarly as lies have nothing in common with freedom of speech, Russian propaganda has nothing to do with journalism. All those involved in the mass media cluster of military industry complex of Russia bear the same degree of responsibility for rousing hatred and mass human rights abuse in the East of Ukraine as Russian Government, which is responsible for 'hybrid war', which it conducts through its created and supported proxy-agents, i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

5 www.stopfake.org/lozh-itar-tass-pro-ukrainskie-radikaly-napali-na-antifashistskij-miting-v-donetske/
6 www.gtmarket.ru/laboratory/publicdoc/2007/782
7 www.radiosvoboda.org/content/news/27047516.html
8 www.newsru.ua/ukraine/12mai2015/18pereselecevu.html

From the conversation with Viacheslav Tetekin, Member of Russian Duma:

"In recent months, our country saw rise of such an absolutely new phenomenon as volunteer movement. These are people who are going to Novorossiia on their own free will and without seeking profit to defend our brothers there. Some sources say that around 30 thousand volunteers participated in the war. Much to our regret many of them die in combat, get seriously wounded. We have to understand that they complete the mission of state importance".

www.kprf.ru/activity/army/136682.html



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
May 2014

Separatist gunman code-named Spets waits for the funeral ceremony of a recent fighting victim to begin in the town of Kramatorsk (at the moment this city belongs to the area controlled by the Ukrainian government).

Sabotage Of The Infrastructure Of Reason

9 points on Kremlin's "not simply propaganda" by Peter Pomerantsev

1. "Whatever the Russians were doing, it was not simply propaganda, which is intended to persuade and susceptible to debunking. This was something else entirely: not only could it not be disproven, it seemed **to vaporise the very idea of proof**".
2. "Since the end of the cold war, Russia had been preoccupied with the need to match the capabilities of the US and its allies. In 1999, Marshal Igor Sergeev, then minister of defence, admitted that Russia could not compete militarily with the west. Instead, he suggested, it needed to search for "revolutionary paths" and "asymmetrical directions". Over the course of the previous decade, **Russian military and intelligence theorists began to elaborate more substantial ideas for non-physical warfare** – claiming that Russia was already under attack, along similar lines, by western NGOs and media. In 2013 the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Valery Gerasimov, claimed that it was now possible to defeat enemies through a "combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns". This was part of a vision of war which lay not in the realm of physical contact but in what Russian theorists described as the "psychosphere". **These wars of the future would be fought not on the battlefield but in the minds of men**".
3. "Disinformation and psychological operations are as old as the Trojan horse. But what distinguished the Kremlin's approach from that of its western rivals was this **new stress on the "psychosphere" as the theatre of conflict**. The **information operation was no longer auxiliary to some physical struggle or military invasion: now it had become an end in itself**".
4. "A guiding tactical concept in the Russian information war is the **idea of "reflexive control"**. According to Timothy L Thomas, an analyst at the US army's Foreign Military Studies Office, and an expert in recent Russian military history and theory, reflexive control involves "conveying to an opponent specially prepared information to incline him voluntarily to make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action". In other words, to know your adversary's behaviour patterns so well you can provoke him into doing what you want. In Soviet times, "reflexive control" had been the subject of extensive academic study".
5. "The semantic lock that seals the North Atlantic treaty is Article 5, which states that a military attack on one Nato nation is an attack on all. Obama cited Article 5 in his Tallinn speech, describing it as "crystal clear". But what if you could undermine this principle without firing a single bullet? **Would a cyber-attack on Bulgaria by unknown actors sympathetic to Russia invoke Article 5? What about a tiny insurrection in a Baltic border town, organised by locals with suspicious ties to Russian security services? Would all the countries in Nato go to war to keep Estonian electronic banking online? In 2010, one Russian warship was spotted in Latvian waters; in 2014, the total was 40. Latvian aeroplanes were scrambled five times** in 2010; in 2014 that figure was over a hundred, as Russian planes swooped into Baltic airspace. Meanwhile, in February, Russian bombers were spotted off the coast of Cornwall. All these manoeuvres put Nato in a double bind".
6. "The mantra of Margarita Simonyan, who heads RT, is: "There is no such thing as objective reporting." This may be true, but RT's mission is to push the truism to its breaking point... At a time when many in the west have lost faith in the integrity and authority of mainstream media organisations, **RT seems dedicated to the proposition that after the notion of objectivity has evaporated, all stories are equally true...** If a commitment to the impossibility of objective reporting means that any position, however bizarre, is no better or worse than any other, **the ultimate effect, which may be the intended one, is to suggest that all media organisations are equally untrustworthy – and to elevate any journalistic errors by the BBC or New York Times into indisputable signs they are lackeys of their own governments**".
7. "**The conspiratorial flights of fancy that fill up RT's airtime are reminiscent of "active measures", the old-school KGB psyops tactics** that the Soviet defector Oleg Kalugin described as "the heart and soul of the intelligence services". Departments dedicated to active measures did not seek to collect intelligence. Their aim, said Kalugin, was "subversion: **to drive wedges in the western community, particularly Nato, and weaken the United States**". A favourite tactic was to place fake stories, "*dezinformatsiya*", in international news outlets. Where once the KGB would have spent months, or years, carefully planting well-made forgeries through covert agents in the west, the new *dezinformatsiya* is cheap, crass and quick: created in a few seconds and thrown online. **The aim seems less to establish alternative truths than to spread confusion about the status of truth**. In a similar vein, the aim of the professional pro-Putin online trolls who haunt website comment sections is to make any constructive conversation impossible".
8. "Taken together, all these efforts constitute a kind of **linguistic sabotage of the infrastructure of reason: if the very possibility of rational argument is submerged in a fog of uncertainty, there are no grounds for debate – and the public can be expected to decide that there is no point in trying to decide the winner, or even bothering to listen**".
9. "At moments of financial and geopolitical uncertainty, people turn to outlandish theories to explain crises. Once the idea of rational discourse has been undermined, spectacle is all that remains. **The side that tells better stories, and does so more aggressively – unencumbered by scrupulousness about their verifiability – will edge out someone trying to methodically "prove" a fact**".

After *The Guardian*
theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information-psychology

Peter POMERANTSEV

is a TV producer, analyst and journalist based in London. He is one of the most prominent researchers of the new Russian's information policy and weaponization of information. His essay *Inside the Kremlin's Hall of Mirrors* published by *The Guardian* became one of the most sympathetic and important in the sense of the recognition of the Kremlin's propaganda problem not in the eyes of security services or military experts but on the public level in the West. Here you can find some of the most interesting thoughts from this piece which is published both in English and Russian on *The Guardian* website – theguardian.com



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
January 2015

*Ukrainian soldiers walk past
a dead body of a pro-Russia
separatist near Donetsk
airport.*

Arkadiy BABCHENKO: *Without Russian TV There Would be No War in Ukraine*

- Arkadiy, you've told in the recent interview that if there was no influence of Russian TV, there would be no war in the Eastern Ukraine and that this is the first war caused by "goebelsovshchina" (after Goebbels, — ed. NOTE). Please explain your thought.

- There were some premises for the confrontation (but not for the war) in the Eastern Ukraine. Same as there were contradictions between Eastern and Western Ukraine starting even from the Soviet times. But the thing is that it was Russia, its propaganda and "Goebelsovshchina" that turned the situation into a war. The large scale brainwash started claiming that "fascists", "banderovtsi" were coming, "they are going to kill you", "they crucify the Russian speaking children", "they rape the grannies" and so on. These claims brought people to a condition of readiness to take the weapon and go to the frontline. That was entirely the merit of the TV. This war came out of the blue.



Not to mention that this war was started by Russia – after all Strelkov whose group was the first that came into Sloviansk, told recently: if there were no us, there would be no war since people refused to take the weapon and to fight. If there was no Russia, confrontation could have ended up like it was in Kharkiv, where the Maidan countered the Antimaidan (although I have to mention that Antimaidan was whipped up by Russia as well) or as in Odessa (although I think that Odessa tragedy was provoked by Russia too).

- Have you faced that directly as a field journalist?

- Yes, I have, on my own example. About a year ago my portrait was hanged out among other "national betrayers" on the barricades near the Donetsk administrative building. I was named a "spy", "liberal bastard", "banderovets" and so on. After that Russian TV started to show such films as "Another 17 friends of junta" (a film created by the Russian pro-government NTV channel, dedicated to the Russian public figures who supported Ukraine; first part of the movie is called "Junta's 13", — ed. note), blamed me for

fascism and publish my home address with the note «fascists collaborator».

- And if you try to compare this propaganda intensity with the year 2008 and events of Russian-Georgian war? There was propaganda too.

- There was propaganda, but there was no intensity of this kind, there was no hysteria. But, of course, there was the lie (for instance, about the two thousands of killed people, about the "Georgian fascism"). In that case Russia was also prepared for the aggression in advance and it only needed an excuse. And Georgia gave an excuse.

- People who do not face the Russian informational space directly often say that in the war circumstances everyone uses the propaganda, Ukraine in particular. Do you think Ukrainian and Russian propaganda can be compared?


- First of all, not everyone uses propaganda. And propaganda cannot be opposed by the counter-propaganda, especially when it comes to such powerful propaganda machine as the one created by Russia. Propaganda should be opposed only by the truth. There are the elements of propaganda in Ukraine indeed. But when for example fake news are published by the Ukrainian media, usually it is rather because of the unprofessional approach, unchecked information, a wish to earn the rating on a "roasted" facts. It is important to underline that propaganda can be only of the state origin. In Ukraine, as we all know, everything is fine with the freedom of speech, and there are lots of private media. That is why I think that such a posing the question does not correspond to the truth.

- Lastly I would like to ask you a bit philosophical question: for whom does this large scale propaganda campaign pose a threat first of all: for Ukraine, for the EU? Maybe, it is a threat for Russia itself?

- For Russia itself for sure. Excuse me, but even the Soviet Union where propaganda and censorship were 100%, at least relied on brains. Instead of that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin decided to rely on "gopniks" (according to Wikipedia, it is a pejorative term and a social slur used in Russia, post-Soviet countries, and Israel to refer to young lower-class suburban male dwellers (usually under 30 years of age) coming from families of poor education and income, somewhat similar to British chavs, spides or neds sub-cultures). At the moment gopniks are the ruling class in Russia.

Every effort is made in Russia to force the intellectual, independent, creative, free people to escape from Russia. Since that would make the country easy to run. But this kind of countries does not live long.

Propaganda campaign was planted in the ground of "mental debilitation policy" which lasts for 15 years already and which is implemented via TV. That lowered the level of society and created the ground for Dmitrii Kiselev. Dmitrii Kiselev would not have worked on the unprepared ground.



Arkadiy BABCHENKO

is a Russian military journalist. He used to participate in both Chechen wars as a soldier. After 2000 he works as a correspondent. He specializes in the military journalism. As a war correspondent he covered the war in Georgia in 2008. Arkadiy is also known as an author of contemporary military prose. His books are translated into 16 languages in 22 countries of the world. Among the most famous books are *One Soldier's War in Chechnya* (New York, 2000, London, 2008), *Argun* (Moscow, 2006), *Die Farbe des Krieges* (Berlin, 2007).

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CCL - CENTER FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES

CCL was established in May 2007 to promote human rights and the values of democracy and solidarity in Ukraine and Eurasia. The NGO is based in Kyiv, Ukraine. Last year, the Center for Civil Liberties began documenting human rights violations during the EuroMaidan events and subsequently in Crimea and Donbas. CCL conducts this work by deploying mobile groups to different parts of the liberated areas in Donbas to gather and verify information on human rights abuses.

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PIN - PEOPLE IN NEED

PIN is one of the largest non-profit organizations that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism. PIN has implemented humanitarian and development projects, programs aimed at supporting human rights and democracy and reducing social exclusion in more than 25 countries around the world. Since the 1990s, PIN's Center for Human Rights and Democracy has focused its work on repressive and transitional countries and currently has programs in cooperation with local partners in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Libya, Moldova (Transnistria), Nicaragua, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela. PIN is also the organizer of the One World Human Rights Documentary Film Festival.

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EUROMAYDAN SOS

It is self-organized group of human rights and civil society activists, lawyers, journalists and other concerned citizens of different professions. Initiative group Euromaydan SOS was created as a response to the illegal actions of the authorities to disperse peaceful demonstration at night from 29 to 30 of November 2013 at the Independence Square. The main purpose of Initiative group Euromaydan SOS is to provide operative and legal assistance to Euromaydan victims not only in Kyiv but also in Ukrainian regions. The Initiative group collect and analyze information and testimonies to protect peaceful protesters and the families of the killed on Maidan and injured people. Now the initiative conducts control over the investigation of Maidan case and conducts public campaigns to defend human rights in Ukraine.

facebook.com/EvromaidanSOS
euromaidansos.org/en

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THIS BROCHURE IS NOT FOR SALE

Photo by Sergei L. Loiko
Design and page layout – Mykhailo Fedyshak



PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
October 2014

*Ukrainian troops
take cover during a mortar
attack inside Donetsk airport.*



Sergei LOIKO

PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
LOS ANGELES TIMES
October 2014

*Self-portrait of
Sergei L. Loiko
inside Donetsk
airport.*

Photo correspondent of Los Angeles Times in Moscow Sergei Loiko had 25 working trips to the war in total : Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq... Ukraine became the 25th. Sergei has been following the situation in Ukraine through the camera lens during more than 1,5 years, since the beginning of Maidan. But that were the photos from the Donetsk airport of the last fall which made a furor in the world and in Ukraine.



By the way, not only photos made by of Sergei Loiko became resonant, but his words too. The interview given to the "Echo Moskvy" radio was deleted from the web-site immediately after the issuing a warning by the very specific Russian official body called "Roskomnadzor". "Roskomnadzor" claimed the interview contained

"the information justifying the practice of the war crimes". It is important to mention that after the publication of the interview Sergei started to get not only thankfulness but lots of phone calls with the threats (up to death threats) and insults. A brick was thrown in the window of his country house near Moscow.

PHOTO: Sergei L. Loiko
July 2014

